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The research paper aims to establish the effect of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 on African 
Customary law. To this end, there will be a thorough discussion of whether customary law has a 
philosophical underpinning (a so11 of African customary jurisprudence) and subsequently, 
whether aspects of African philosophy have been incorporated in the constitution, or in 
legislation enacted thereafter_ 
The paper relied heavily on documentary research with great reference to journal m1icles (these 
form the greater pa11 of the research) as well as a number of books which have been instrumental 
in determining the future of customary law. 
Most of the findings made in this research paper will show that little is said in the Constitution 
regarding the place of customary law, with very narrow reference to it made in A11icle 2 of the 
Constitution. What it will show, however, is that implicitly, owing to numerous other provisions 
in the Constitution (many of which will be looked at in this paper) there is potential for 
customary law to thrive and those who largely live according to its principles have been 
accounted for in the cunent Constitution. There will also be a comparison between Kenya ' s and 
South Africa's customary law regime. 
The key recommendations made in this paper are regarding research and legislation. It 
recommends that there should be an increase in research into the area of African customary law, 
and there should be increased legislation of customary principles. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Kenya's colonization changed the lives of its indigenous people forever. The colonialists 
changed the socio-political and legal structure in force in the region. They realized that the 
westernization of the people was essential for them to entrench their normative order in the 
region. With this is in mind, they set about imposing their culture and their law on the natives. 
Okoth-Ogendo observed that the colonial powers in Kenya applied English law as the basic law 
of the land and applied it in vi1iually every sphere of life in the territory.' This illustrates the 
subjugation of African law during the colonial period. 
The period after independence, prior to the passing of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, saw 
customary law recognized under Section 82 of the Constitution of Kenya (Repealed). The 
Judicature Act2, however, placed customary law below other sources of law. Customary law was 
subject to written laws and would not be applied in instances where it would be repugnant to 
justice and morality. 3 Peter Onyango observes that this provision of the Judicature Act places 
customary law at the bottom of the hierarchy of laws.4 
The subjugation of customary law against other sources of law was seen even in land law. The 
cases of Esiroyo v Esiroyo 5 and Obiero v Opiyo6 showed this when the court, despite 
recognizing ownership of land under customary law, declared that those customary rights were 
extinguished by the registration of the land under the Registered Land Act (Cap.300) (Repealed). 
This meant that customary ownership of land could be nullified in the event that a party 
proceeded to register the land in his own name. 
This paper posits that the passing of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 has led to the re-emergence 
of customary legal principles. The new constitutional dispensation has allowed customary law to 
1 Okoth-Ogendo H, 'The Tragic African commons: A century of expropriation, suppression and subversion ', No. 24, 
Land Reform and Agrarian Change in Southern Africa, an occasional paper series, School of Government, 
University of Western Cape, 2002, 5. 
2 Cap 8 of the Laws of Kenya. 
3 Section 3 (2), Judicature Act (Cap 8 of the Laws of Kenya) 1967. 
4 Onyango P, African Custommy Law System: An Introduction, LawAfi·ica Publishing (Kenya), 2013 , 75 . 
5 (1973) EA 388. 
6 (1972) EA 227. 
inform legislation and judicial decisions with greater force than had been the case in the past. For 
instance, Article 159 of the Constitution requires courts to be guided by the principle of 
alternative dispute resolution including traditional dispute resolution. The Marriage Act 2014 
also allows for the application of traditional forms of dispute resolution when resolving marital 
. 7 
Issues. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The subjugation of customary law was detrimental to the people who ascribed to it, particularly 
in personal matters. Kenya became a country where those who lived outside the dominant 
normative order (statutory law) would essentially be living in spite of the law and whenever the 
arm of the law would reach for them it would be to their detriment. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1.3.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVE 
The overall object of the research is to highlight the re-emergence of African customary 
jurisprudence following the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
1.3.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
(i) To look into the history of customary law in Kenya and assess the place of African 
customary jurisprudence throughout Kenya ' s legal history both prior to, and after the 
promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 . 
(ii) To highlight specific aspects of African customary legal thinking are re-emerging 
under the current constitutional dispensation and to show if this re-emergence can be 
linked to the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
(iii) To discern the potential effects of a re-emergence of customary jurisprudence to 
society. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following are the research questions that the study will seek to answer: 
7 Section 68, Marriage Act (No. 4 of2014). 
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(i) What has been the historical development of African customary jurisprudence in 
Kenya from the pre-colonial period, until the promulgation of the Constitution of 
Kenya 2010? 
(ii) Is the whole of African customary legal thinking re-emerging or is it only specific 
aspects of African culture that are informing the law? Can this re-emergence be 
linked to the Constitution? 
(iii) What are the potential effects of the re-emergence of African customary legal 
thinking, positive or otherwise? 
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The research is likely to be faced by certain challenges that need to be mitigated. One such 
---j challenge may be the current scarcity of written material on the subject. Most of the reference 
materials relevant to customary law (such as books and articles) were written prior to the 
promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and thus are likely to give little insight into the 
effect the Constitution has on customary law. 
1.6 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
Below is the chapter breakdown: 
Chapter One: Introduction 
This will be the opening chapter of the study and will seek to introduce the main concepts that 
the study will look at. It will also serve as a guide to the structure of the study, the research 
questions and objectives of the study and outline the proposed structure that the study will 
follow. This chapter will give the reader a view into the hypotheses prior to the research so that 
the reader may be able to discern, by the end of the paper, whether or not the research objectives 
were met. 
3 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Introduction 
This chapter will look into the conceptual background behind the research topic. It will seek to 
develop the theoretical framework behind the idea of African customary law first as being 
validly refened to as 'law' and as containing within it a legal theory governing the rationale for 
having the various customs that comprise African customary law. The chapter will be careful not 
to generalize African customary law given that it differs from community to community but will 
attempt to show that there is a rationale for every custom and so a jurisprudential dimension to 
African customary law. 
Chapter Three: Historical Background 
~-=-j In this part of the chapter, the research paper shall look into historical development of African 
I 
-) 
customary law pre and post colonial period. The paper will seek to show how the colonial period 
slowly led to the subjugation of African customary law and legal thinking. 
Chapter Four: Customary Law under the Current Legal Framework 
This will be the main part of the research. It will be in this topic that the research paper will give 
a critical analysis ofthe current laws and the effect they have on customary jurisprudence. It will 
attempt to show how customary legal thinking has informed particular fields of law. In this part 
of the chapter, there will be an analysis of various statutes showing evidence of legal principles 
that are informed by African culture and thus African customary legal thinking. This chapter will 
also look at jurisprudence emanating from the courts regarding the constitutional treatment of 
customary law. 
Chapter Five: Potential Consequences of a Re-emergence of African Customary 
Jurisprudence from the South African Experience 
This chapter of the study will attempt to predict the potential consequences of a renaissance in 
African customary legal thinking. It will rely on the infonnation gathered from experts as 




Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations 
The concluding chapter will show what the study was able to prove during its study and give 
recommendations on the way forward , factoring in the potential merits and demerits of a re-
emergence of African customary jurisprudence. 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research will utilize a desk-based approach to acquire the information necessary for the final 
paper. The desk-based approach will seek to utilize articles, books, statutes and judicial 
precedents relevant to the topic, which will be accessed both through e-resources, the Strathmore 
University Library and the McMillan Library. 
The data shall be analyzed qualitatively utilizing the deductive approach of qualitative analysis. 
This approach entails using the research questions to group the data then looking at the 
similarities and differences of the information acquired. It is appropriate given the limited time 
available to conduct the study 
The research will also have a comparative aspect with the treatment of customary law in South 
Africa being contrasted with the treatment of customary law in Kenya. The choice of South 
Africa as a case study is based on South Africa's highly sophisticated customary law regime 




The research topic seeks to establish whether the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 
has led to a renaissance of African customary jurisprudence in Kenya. The first issue that the 
chapter seeks to determine is whether African customary has a legal philosophy. A further 
necessary preliminary step that this chapter will grapple with is whether customary law can 
validly be described as law in the first place. This chapter develops in detail a case for African 
customary law as law and illuminates the various arguments for and against the thought of 
African customary law as law and therefore capable of having juristic thought. 
2.1 WHETHER CUSTOMARY LAW HAS A LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
To understand whether or not the new constitutional dispensation has ushered in a renaissance in 
-~ traditional legal thinking, we must first establish whether or not one can validly speak of a 
' customary jurisprudence' . If customary legal thinking does not exist, then neither can its 
renaissance. Some of the literature touching on African customary law has attempted to grapple 
with whether it is law and whether there exists an African philosophy of law, have are addressed 
in this review. 
Holleman8 makes the assertion that there is no African jurisprudence. This assertion is founded 
on the notion that there was no formalized system of legal study in the traditional African setting. 
It seems to suggest that a philosophy (of law for example) requires a deliberate and systematized 
study. African societies had no such structured conception of the law. Holleman assumes that 
there needs to be a formal philosophical study of law by a society, for there to be a philosophy of 
law in that society. What Holleman does not recognize, however, is that the lack of deliberate 
discussion on the philosophy of law does not necessarily connote the lack of a philosophy behind 
it, just merely the lack of a structured study of it. 
Ayinla9 agrees with this notion, however, only m so far as there was no articulation of a 
philosophy of law. Ayinla goes one step further to state that in African societies, there was a 
philosophy of society centred towards the welfare of the community as a whole and the survival 
of each individual. He does, however, posit that in the African context, law was not distinct from 
culture but was, rather, a part of their culture. This, it would seem, suggests, that within their 
8 Holleman J, ' Issues in Aji-ican Law' Mouton and Co, 1974, 13. 
9 Ayinla L, ' African Philosophy of Law' Vol. 6 Journal of International and Comparative law (2002), 152. 
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philosophy of society upon which their culture depended, there was a 'philosophy of law' that 
informed the norms and customs that would govern their societies. This study aligns itself with 
Ayinla's position regarding customary jurisprudence showing that through the African 
philosophy of society, we see an African philosophy of law. 
Adewoye Omoniyi illustrated the existence of juristic thought (despite the absence of a 
formalized philosophy of law) in the proverbs of the Y aruba. He posits that proverbs are tools 
through which knowledge is transferred. They are expressions of thought, and expressions of the 
truth. 10 Proverbs are expressions of culture and ordinarily do not have legal principles. In the 
African society, however, proverbs were used to convey legal realities in the respective 
communities. Juristic thought, given the intertwining between law and culture, was actually 
---? expressed in the various cultural expressions such as proverbs. 
I 
In discerning the existence of juristic thought among African societies, the starting point, which 
Elias addresses, is to determine whether the norms governing them were in fact capable of being 
considered law. Elias posits that customary law can validly be regarded as law despite its 
informal nature. The next subchapter will look into the validity of customary law as law. 
2.2 AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW AS LAW 
The question of the validity of African customary as law hinges on the age old jurisprudential 
question, what is the definition of law. To a positivist, African customary law cannot be regarded 
as law. The mention of positivism is of pat1icular impo11ance in the Kenyan context given that 
law in many common law jurisdictions is largely founded on a positivist conception of law and 
Kenya is no exception to this. 11 The approach that this study will take in developing the idea of 
customary law as law is to first look at the arguments put forward by positivists explaining why 
customary law is not law, followed by arguments propounded against those brought forward by 
the positivists. 
Positivist legal thought as propounded by John Austin defines law as a command by a political 
superior to his political inferiors. He continues to define the very nature of a command as 
10 Omoniyi A, ' Proverbs as a Vehicle of Juristic Thought Among the Yoruba' Obafemi Awolowo University Law 
Journal vols. 3 and 4. (1987), 1-2. 
11 Gachenga E. W, Integrating Customary and Statutory Law Systems of Water Governance for Sustainable 
Development: The Case of The Marak wet of Kenya, Unpublished thesis for Doctor of Philosophy, School of Law, 
University of Western Sydney 2012, 54. 
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canying the ability of the par1y commanding it to inflict pain upon those who disregard such a 
command. 12 To Austin, such a command was characterized as being a wish of the political 
superior, followed with a sanction for non-compliance and promulgated through words or 
signs. 13 These for him were relevant features of positive law, or law properly called, as we would 
call it. To Austin, then it would be improper to refer to customary law as law. One feature about 
customary law, as explained by Gordon R Woodman, is that customary laws have different 
degrees of mandatory force. 14 Austin would be hard pressed to consider such a system to be law, 
assuming that he would recognize the political authority that the leaders of a particular African 
community have is valid. 
Elizabeth Gachenga argues that to the modern positivist, a law, rightly called is founded on 
reason. So for Hobbes, the ' Leviathan' would have a reason behind the laws he promulgates, or 
the political superior envisaged by Austin would make commands that are reasonable, or 
Dworkin ' s ' Judge Hercules' would make a judicial decision that is founded on a higher wisdom. 
For the positivists, customary law developed as a result of the practices of the communities 
bound by it and so would have been based on the practice of the people, and not the right reason 
of a political authority. In any event, as Gachenga argues, if a sort of accumulated wisdom were 
attributed to the customs of the people developed over the years, the positivists such as Hobbes 
would prefer law founded on authority which would be more certain. 15 
Hm1, in his 'Concept of Law' , argues that the ordering of a society by behavioural nmms cannot 
be deemed to be law. In his view, primitive societies are characterized by such norms and that 
only in societies that are ' closely knit by kinship, common sentiment, belief,' and are placed in a 
stable environment. Only then, according to Hart, can behavioural norms or customs be 
sufficient. 16 And such communities, he feels are in the minority of cases and he feels then that 
this system is likely to fail given such norms ordinarily lack sufficient coercive power as would 
ordinary laws. 
12 Austin J, 'The Province of Jurisprudence Determined ', Published by John Murray, Albemarle Street London, 
1832, 6. 
13 Austin J, ' The Province of Jurisprudence Determined', II . 
14 Woodman G, ' A Survey of Customary Laws In Africa', The Future Of African Custommy Law, edited by 
Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins, published by Cambridge University Press, New York 2011 , 13-14. 
15 Gachenga E. W, Integrating Customary and Statutory Law Systems of Water Governance for Sustainable 
Development: The Case of The Marakwet of Kenya, 65 . 
16 Hart, HLA, 'The Concept of Law ', Clarendon Press, 1961 , 92 . 
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In summary, it seems that the positivist attack on customary legal systems is founded on two 
dominant premises: Customs lack the requisite coercive force of a valid law, and in any event, 
customs are not founded on the right thinking of a political authority but are rather only merely 
founded on the behaviour of the people. 
Legal scholars have countered these assertions through vanous legal arguments. First, the 
rationale that customary law lacks coercive force seems to ignore the fact that in many traditional 
societies disregard of the law often carried fear of reprimand from the deities of a particular 
community. In many traditional societies, much unlike their more secular modern counterparts, 
the way of living of the people was governed by certain norms which were intertwined with 
religious beliefs. Fear of the wrath of their gods served as a sufficient coercive force among the 
members of a particular community. Coerciveness in the traditional customary law regime is also 
evident where disregard of the accepted norms was followed by social disdain. In the traditional 
African setting honour and respect in the community was something that every family strove 
towards . 
Woodman argues that the coercive power that legislative authorities have in a positivist system is 
founded in a social acceptance of the authority of the legislature. 17 This, he argues is a form of 
customary acceptance that the legislature or the relevant sovereign charged with the 
responsibility of making laws is the right authority to do so. He therefore argues that it would be 
paradoxical for positivists to argue that customary law is invalid yet there is a customary 
acceptance ofthe authority ofthe sovereign to inflict pain (as Austin would put it) as punishment 
for disobedience. In similar vein, the coercive nature of African customary law (if such nature 
were to be a mandatory requirement of the validity of a law) would be founded on the belief of 
the people that they are bound by those laws; an opinio juris sive nessecitas, 18 so to speak. 
As regards the view that customary law is not founded on the right thinking of a recognized 
authority, the positivists are in error given that in traditional African settings, the political 
authority was often held by councils of elders, chiefs, and in some cases by kings. 19 These 
authorities were often referred to when disputes arose, and in perhaps more sophisticated 
17 Woodman G, ' A Survey ofCustomary Laws In Africa ', II. 
18 This Latin maxim represents a belief on the part of a person that they were legally bound to perform a certain task. 
See http://definitions.uslegal.com/o/opinio-juris-sive-necessitatis/ accessed on 16'" March 2016. 





societies such as the Baganda who had a legislative body referred to as the lukiiko20, these 
authorities made the laws of the land rather than aimlessly following the customary practices of 
the people. These political authorities were required to exercise wisdom in the application of the 
laws that governed the people so as to safeguard harmony in the community. 
Some legal theorists are of the view that law in its broader sense, going beyond legislation or any 
other formal rule-making processes while criticizing the positivist view of law. Nyasani, speaks 
of law as being a paradigm that guides the actions of rational as well as inanimate beings21 The 
law of gravity, for instance would qualify as a law, same as the law of contract. He embraces the 
fact that the unwritten laws still falls within the broader conception of law such that though 
unwritten and informal forms of law may have limited legal impact, they still control the actions 
of people and in that sense, they are in fact laws. To Nyasani, customary law would thus be 
validly perceived as law. 
Taslim Olawale Elias22 grappled with the notion of whether customary law can validly be 
considered as law. He points out that the mechanism for securing social order in a society need 
not be so highly institutionalized to be regarded as law. He asser1s that the existence of a legal 
framework need not depend on the formalization and institutionalization of the law. 23 So long as 
there is a normative order through which society is governed, there in itself exists a law, devoid 
of the formality that is characteristic of Western systems of law. Therefore according to Elias, it 
would not be proper to disregard customary law on account of its informality. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The study has established that despite the various arguments to the contrary, African customary 
law is law and has a legal philosophy guiding its principles. The philosophy of society, which 
guides African culture as a whole, provides the basis for African customary law as well. 
20 lmp://afritorial.com/tribe-the-baganda-ugandas-royal-kingdom-past-present/ accessed on 23'd March 2016 
21 Nyasani M. J, 'Legal Philosophy: Jurisprudence ', Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press, 1995, 11. 
22 Elias T, ' Legal Theory: A Nigerian Perspective' in M.l Jegede, Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence, Lagos: MJJ 
Publishers L TO, 1993, 12-13 . 
23 Elias T, ' Legal Theory: A Nigerian Perspective ' in M 1 Jegede, Nigerian Essays in Jurisprudence, Lagos : MJJ 
Publishers LTD, 1993, 12-13. 
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3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN KENYA 
This chapter aims to look at the treatment of African customary law in Kenya during the colonial 
period as well as after independence but under the previous constitution. This chapter will 
attempt to show how the events occasioned by colonialism led to the subjugation of African 
customary law. It will then proceed to analyze the effect of independence on the place of 
customary law. The latter analysis will attempt to show what steps, if any, were taken to see a 
revival of African customary law, or which further subjugated it. 
3.1 THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD 
Prior to the arrival of the British into East Africa, customary law was applied extensively to all 
spheres of life and was the dominant normative order among the communities in Kenya. 24 -, -1 George Otieno Ochich argues that given the lack of a centralized system of law-making, 
customary law had to be applicable as it was, that is, in all spheres of life?5 Most communities 
had a governance structure that began from the family, which was secondary to the clan which, 
together with the other clans, were governed by a council of elders. 26 The clan would be 
comprised of various families sharing a common ancestor. 27Some communities in Kenya, 
however, were ruled by a single ruler such as the Nabongo who was the king among the Wanga 
sub-community. 28 Other communities such as the Nandi and the Maasai had influential 
individuals who known as the orkoiyot and the oloibon (respectively). The influence that these 
individuals had was as a result of their role as religious leaders29 
These authorities were the custodians of the law of the society and were often charged with 
settling disputes between the parties. This role meant that these authorities would articulate the 
law and to some extent make the law. These authorities governed the various communities in 
Kenya prior to the coming of the colonialists. 
24 Ochich G 0 , 'The Withering Province of Customary Law in Kenya' in Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins, 'The Future 
of African Custom my Law' Cambridge University Press, 20 II, I 04. 
250chich G 0 , ' The Withering Province of Customary Law in Kenya' , I 04. 
26 http: //www.meac.l!.o .ke/ index.php/20 14-08-29-09-36-03/2014-08-29-09-46-? 5 accessed on 23rd March 2016 
27 http: //www.meac.go .ke/ index.php/20 14-08-29-09-36-03/20 14-08-29-09-46-'5 accessed on 23rd March 2016 
28 https:l/abawanga. wordpress.com/ accessed on 23'd March 20 13 ; 
29 Okoth A, 'A History of Africa: African societies and the Establishment of Colonial Rule 1800-/915' , East African 
Educational Publishers, 2003 , 35 ; Cheater A, 'Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction' Tyler and Francis 
e-library, 2005, 99 
II 
3.2 THE COLONIAL ERA 
The arrival of the missionaries is arguably what marked the beginning of the subjugation of 
African customary law. Christopher Allen argues that missionary education legitimized 
Europeanization and therefore formed a basis upon which the authority of the Colonial 
government would be accepted.30 Much as it is largely accepted that this was an unintended 
consequence on the part of the missionaries, some African customs would often be condemned 
by the missionaries as repugnant and backward. Western civilization was taught and emphasized. 
Allen notes that among the Kikuyu, Christianity had led to the adoption of new customs, 
evidence of the impact of missionary work on customary law. 31 Once the people began to change 
their way of life, their customs began to change and so their 'customary law'. 
The passing of the East Africa Order in Council in 1897, confen·ed on the Commissioner of the 
Protectorate (as Kenya then was) the power to legislate under the Queen's regulations.32 This 
effectively meant that he could make the law governing the Protectorate (in total disregard of the 
African political authorities that existed in Kenya at the time). The Order in Council only 
allowed African Customary law to be applicable to natives and in so far as they are not 
repugnant to justice and morality. The standards of justice and morality were not set in the 
legislation and thus were wholly dependent on the Commissioner. This saw the emergence of 
what has come to be known as the repugnancy doctrine a doctrine of law in colonial Africa that 
saw the disregard of any African laws deemed to be inconsistent with European notions of 
justice and morality. This is why the repugnancy clause has been regarded by some scholars as 
being an engine of cultural imperialism.33 
Section 20 of the East Africa Native Courts (Amendment) Ordinance 1902 is regarded by some 
as the one of the earliest steps in subjugating African customary law in Kenya.34 It stated that, 
"In all cases, civil and criminal to which natives are parties, every court (a) shall be guided by 
native law so .far as is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent 
30 Allen C, ' Missions and the Mediation of Modernity in Colonial Kenya' Volume 20 Issue I (Spring) Penn History 
Review (2013), 23 . 
31 Allen C, 'Missions and the Mediation of Modernity in Colonial Kenya' , 23. 
32 Ochich G 0 , 'The Withering Province of Customary Law in Kenya ', I 05. 
33 Okoth-Ogendo H, ' Customary Law in the Kenyan Legal System-An Old Debate Revived ', in Ojwang JB and 
Mugambi JNK, ' The SM Otieno Case: Death and Burial in Modern Kenya ' Nairobi University Press, 1989, 143 . 
34 Ochich G 0 , 'The Withering Province of Customary Law in Kenya ', 106. 
12 
with any Order in Council, Ordinance or any Regulation or Rule made under any 
Ordinance ... "35 
Section 7 of the Kenya Colony Order in Council 1921 replicated Section 20 of the 1902 
Ordinance but this time mandated every comt in the colony to apply African customary law only 
so far as it is consistent with the laws made in the colony. Since the colonial administration was 
effectively and a white dominated Legislative Council (in 1921 it was wholly comprised of 
Settlers), it came as no surprise that the laws that were adopted in the colony were essentially 
European laws. Since these legislators had no idea or understanding of African customary law, 
the laws they made would conflict with African customary law more times than it would be 
consistent with it; and since by law it superseded African customary law whenever there was 
inconsistency, African customary law was essentially headed towards its demise. Customary law 
had moved from being the dominant normative order in the land to being at the bottom of the 
hierarchy of laws. 
3.3 CUSTOMARY LAW IN INDEPENDENT KENYA 
The ushering in of Independence saw great hope among the African Kenyans . The struggle for 
an end to white supremacy saw the return of Kenya to its rightful owners, the Africans. It was 
now the time of the newly independent Africans to exercise sovereignty over their own land that 
they had been denied for generations. 
The importance of African tradition to the Independence government was evident in Sessional 
Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism, which sought to create a new economic system 
founded on African traditions of political democracy and mutual social responsibility36 and non-
aligned to either capitalism and communism. The paper seemed to be advocating for a system 
that would be a hybrid between what is indigenous to Africans and borrowing the best practices 
learned through the colonial era. 
Section 82 of the Independence Constitution states that, although no law shall be valid under the 
Constitution if it is discriminatory, such a law may be valid if it makes provision for the 
application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of customary law with respect to 
35 East Africa Native Courts (Amendment) Ordinance 1902. 






any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case 
of other persons. 37 Peter Onyango argues that this provision was a safeguard of African 
customary law. 38 The negative aspect of this provision, however, was that it only meant that 
customary law would be applicable even if it contravened the Constitutional right against 
discrimination.39 In that sense, it is arguable whether it safeguards customary law as a whole. 
The reality, however, after Kenya attained its independence, was that the interests of the 
remaining settlers formed a key element in the negotiations during the Lancaster Conferences. 
There were fears among the British that a total handover of government to the Africans would 
leave the settler populations vulnerable. These concerns were voiced by Lord Colyton in the 
House of Lords debate on the Kenya Conferences in 1962.40 In order to safeguard these 
European interests, Otieno Ochich argues, the English laws that had been passed prior to 
independence were retained and renamed from Ordinances to 'Acts '. 41 The retention of these 
English laws meant that African Customary law would continue to be subjugated. 
The Judicature Act, Cap. 8 of the laws of Kenya was passed in 1967 and gave the hierarchy of 
laws applicable in courts. Rather than raising the position of African customary law, as may have 
been intended by the independence government, section 3 of the Act placed customary law at the 
bottom of the hierarchy of laws, beneath the Constitution, Acts of Parliament and even the 
Common Law and the doctrines of Equity. The Act also saw the return of the repugnancy clause 
stating that customary law would only be applicable provided that it isn't repugnant to justice 
and morality. It is worth noting, however, that the standards of justice and morality remain those 
which the British had instilled in Africans during the colonial period. The colonial message was 
that Africans needed to be westernized to become civilized and so the Western standards of 
justice and morality would be the yardstick upon which the repugnancy of African customary 
laws would be judged.42 
37 Section 82 ( 4 ), Constitution of Kenya (Repealed). 
38 Onyango P, 'Aji·ican Custom my Law System: An Introduction ', 73-74. 
39 Kamau, W, 'Custom my Law and Women 's Rights in Kenya, ' accessed at http: //theegual ityeffect.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014112/CustomaryLawAndWomensRightslnKenya.pdf on 16th January 2016, 10 . 
40 hnp://hansard .millbanksystems.com/lords/1962/mav/15/kenya-conferences#column 530 on 181h January 2016. 
41 Ochich, 'The Withering Province of Customary Law in Kenya', 107. 
42 Buluma B, ' The Case for the Supremacy ofCustomary Law in Kenya ' accessed at 
https://www.academia .edu/9132576/The Case for the Supremacy of Customary Law in Kenya on 19111 January 
2016. 
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The repugnancy test may also be criticized for its uncertainty as evident in Otieno v Ougo and 
another43 popularly known as the SM Otieno case. In this case, the court found that there was no 
law that contradicted burial according to customary law, nor did he find it repugnant to justice 
and morality, in that particular case for the deceased to be buried at his ancestral home. Legal 
scholars, have, however, criticized the position taken by court from the standpoint of gender 
equality. April Gordon argues that the case is a clear example of the place miserable place of 
African women.44 Oketch-Owiti is of the view that the court erred in finding in favour of a law 
that denied a woman from participating in making decisions affecting them.45 The question that 
arises is whether such a discriminatory law may be is or is not repugnant to justice and morality. 
Some judges may have found such a law to be repugnant. 
-l The Magistrates' Courts Act 1967, also adversely affected the application of customary law. 
Prior to the passing of this Act, African courts had could hear matters relating to African 
customary law. These courts applied customary law in all aspects including criminal law. For 
instance, in Kosele African Court Criminal case no 33 of 1966, the accused was ordered to pay a 
customary fine after being convicted of indecent assault.46 In Augustino v. Isabella wlo Onyango 
& A tie no wlo of Onyango,47 the com1 heard a complaint from the plaintiff regarding defamation 
contrary to Luo customs. The Magistrate's Act convet1ed these informal African courts into 
Magistrates' com1s and limited the application of customary law to matters of land, intestacy, 
family, seduction of unmanied women and girls, enticement of manied women to adultery and 
status ofwomen and children.48 
Another example in the post-independence period of the subjugation of customary law is in the 
land regime. Under the old land laws, pat1icularly the Registered Land Act, all title in land was 
only respected so long as it was registered and so a first registration would triumph over other 
interests in land.49 The cases of Esiroyo v Esiroyo and Obiero v Opiyo (referred to in Chapter 
43 
( 1987) eKLR. 
44 Gordon A, ' Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Kenya: "Burying Otieno" Revisited' , Vol. 20, No. 4, Postcolonial, 
Emergent, and Indigenous Feminisms, (Summer, 1995), 883-912, 885. 
45 Gordon A, 'Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Kenya: "Burying Otieno" Revisited', 885 
46 Cited in Kariuki F, 'Custom my Law Jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: Implications for Traditional Justice 
Systems ' http://www.strathmore.edu/sdrc/uploads/documents/books-and-
articles/TDRM%20and%:WJurisprudence.pdf on 20111 January 2016. 
47 Kisumu District Africa CoUI1, CC 299/1966. 
48 Section 2, Magistrates' Act (Cap 10 ofthe Laws of Kenya) . 
49 Section 28, Registered Land Act (Cap 300) (Repealed) . 
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One above) stated that customary rights to land were extinguished by registration of title under 
the Registered Land Act. This, the court held, would be the case despite there being customary 
rights to the land. 
In the context of succession law, parliament passed the Law of Succession Act (Cap. 160 of the 
Laws of Kenya) in 1981 . Prior to the passing of the Act, African estates were governed by either 
the relevant customary law, or under the African Wills Ordinance 1961 .50 The 1981 Act limited 
the application of customary law. Section 2 (1) states that the provisions of the Act apply to all 
succession matters in unless provided otherwise by the Act or any other written law. 51 Justice 
Waki held in Rono v Rono52 held that this section meant that customary law was expressly 
excluded unless provided for by the Act. The only instances where customary law is applicable 
-\ under the Act is; in estates where the deceased died prior to the application of the Act; where a 
testator provides in a will that his property is to be divided according to customary law; and 
where Section 33 applies in the event of intestacy. 53 
During the post-independence period, there was little by way of reform that was intended to 
conect the injustices occasioned by the prior subjugation of African customary law, a 
subjugation which had been intended to further the Colonial agenda. 
50 Musyoka W, ' Law of Succession' Law Africa Publishing 2006, 9-11. 
51 Section 2(1 ), Law of Succession Act (Cap. 160, Laws of Kenya) . 
52 [2005] I EA 363 
53 Musyoka W, ' Law ofSuccession', 22 
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4. THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 AND THE APPARENT 
RENNAISSANCE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 
This chapter will attempt to show how the new constitutional dispensation has affected the place 
of customary law and customary legal thinking. This in effect will look into the main issue in the 
research topic, and will do so at considerable depth. The key hypothesis in this study is that 
customary law is undergoing a renaissance under the current constitutional dispensation in 
Kenya. Therefore in assessing the validity of the hypothesis, the study will look at various 
branches of the law and see whether there is such a re-emergence; and if there is such a re-
emergence, the study will use provisions of the Constitution to show whether it is the 
Constitution that is causing this re-emergence. 
\ 4.1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
At1icle 2 ( 4) of the Constitution of Kenya states that customary law which is inconsistent with 
the Constitution shall be void. It has been argued by some scholars that this provision 
acknowledges customary law but in a negative sense. 54 Some of these scholars argue that the 
effect of the Constitution is to further subjugate customary law. 
This study will show that there are other provisions in the Constitution that serves to enhance 
customary law, or at the very least, encourage legislation that will seek to entrench certain 
principles that are originally African. 
At1icle 11 (1) of the Constitution recognizes culture as the foundation of the nation. Recognition 
of culture under this at1icle gives, to a certain extent, legitimacy to customary normative 
systems. 55 This is so because it is difficult to allow people to live according to their culture and 
yet deny them the oppo11unity to abide by the laws goveming that culture. After all, as discussed 
in chapter two above, African culture was often inte11wined with African law. Therefore to allow 
one without allowing the other would be an oxymoron. 56 The declaration that culture is the 
foundation of the nation, however, is subject to limitations. In Peter Karumbi Keingati & 4 
54 Lumumba PLO, Franceschi L, 'The Constitution of Kenya, 20/0: An lntroductOJJ' Commentary ' Strathmore 
University Press, Nairobi , 2014,71. 
55 Gachenga E, 'Customary Law Systems for Water Governance in Kenya' in Martin P, Bigdeli S, Daya-
Winterbottom T, duPlessis W, Kennedy A, ' The Search for Environmental Justice ' IUCN Academy of 
Environmental Law Series 2012 . 
56 Ayinla L, 'African Philosophy of Law', 152. 
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others v Dr. Ann Nyokabi Nguithi & 3 others57 the court was of the view that Article 11 (1) 
cannot be used to promote cultural practices that are negative, discriminatory or retrogressive as 
the Constitution cannot possibly have envisaged that it may be used for that purpose. Justice 
Kimaru was of the view that this article was envisaged to promote all the positive aspects of 
culture. 
The Constitution goes further to protect the right to culture and language under Article 44. In 
protecting the right of Kenyans to live by a culture of their choice and to belong to a cultural or 
linguistic community, the Constitution thus allows the norms of these cultural and linguistic 
groups to regulate the lives of the people who subscribe to these groups. The net effect of this is 
to provide further legitimacy to customary law as a normative system. In JK (Suing on Behalf of 
CK) v Board of Directors of R School & another, 58 the comi held that in relying on Article 44 
protecting the right to culture, a petitioner ought to prove the cultural practice intended to be 
protected is in fact a part of the culture that he ascribes to. 
Article 11 (2) provides for the protection of traditional knowledge, mandating parliament to 
enact legislation to protect the cultural heritage of the various communities in Kenya by ensuring 
that those who borrow from the heritage of these communities compensate them, as well as 
requiring that royalties are paid to the community for the use of their cultural heritage. This 
recognizes a property right that has its origins in customary law, that is, the communal ownership 
of the intellectual property of the community handed down from generation to generation. In 
furtherance of this aim, Parliament enacted The Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Traditional Expressions Bill 2015 which is yet to be passed into law. 
4.2 LAND LAW 
The customary principle of communal ownership is also evident in Article 63 of the Constitution 
which recognizes communal ownership of land. 59 Okoth-Ogendo notes that to the British 
colonialists, the notion of res communis was the same as their concept of the commons and was 
therefore declared res nullus (nobody's property). 60 After Independence, there was an attempt to 
allow communities to own land under the Trust Lands Act but that Act never formally 
57 [20 14] eKLR. 
58 [2014) eKLR 
59 Article 63 (I), Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0). 
60 Okoth-Ogendo H, ' The Tragic African commons: A centwy of expropriation, suppression and subversion'. 
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recognized ownership of the land by the community but rather bestowed ownership on the group 
representatives who would register the land in their names on behalf of the communities they 
represented. This led to numerous instances where the land was mismanaged for the benefit of 
the registered owners ofthe land. 
The constitutional recognition of communal ownership in land has in this way led to the re-
emergence of the customary principle of communal ownership of land. It has further protected it 
from being disregarded as a system of ownership as was seen in cases such as Esiroyo v Esiroyo 
(discussed above) which declared that registered title trumped customary title to land. 
The problem facing the actualization of communal land ownership is the continued delay m 
passing the Community Land Bill. Justice Nyamweya notes in Joseph Letuya & 21 others v 
Attorney General & 5 others61 (the Ogiek case) that although the Constitution recognizes the 
communal ownership of land, the operation of this constitutional provision has been delayed by 
Parliament's reluctance to pass the Community Land Bill into law. The delay seems to be caused 
by disagreement between the national government, the National Land Commission and the 
County Governments and parliament, over various clauses in the Bill.62 Hopefully, for the sake 
of the various communities which will depend on this legislation, their best interests will be 
factored in when the legislation is finally passed. 
4.3 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The Constitution continues to give legitimacy to customary normative structures by providing in 
Article 159 that judicial authority ought to be guided by, among other things, promoting 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms including traditional dispute resolution mechanisms 
(TDRMs). 63 Although it goes on to provide that the use of TDRMs is limited by the Bill of 
Rights or their inconsistency with either justice and morality; or the Constitution itself or any 
written law, this provision seems to give legitimacy to African customary methods of dispute 
resolution. This provision has been replicated in a number of statutes (which shall be looked at in 
great depth later in the paper). To the extent that practically TDRMs are considered when 
delivering justice, this provision has provided a re-emergence of customary principles which 
61 [2014] eKLR. 
62 http://www.standardmedia.eo.ke/aJticle/2000 178543/20-coast-mps-and-national-land-commission-reject-
proposed-community-land-bill accessed on 24th March 2016 
63 Article 159 (2) (c), Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0). 
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would undoubtedly be at the heart of the TDRMs. In future this may lead to an increased body of 
customary juridical principles as the use ofTDRMs becomes more widespread. 
Francis Kariuki argues that Article 159 has been interpreted by courts as not limiting the 
application of African customary law to civil matters64 and evidence of this is in the decision in 
R v Mohammed Abdow Mohamme~5 where the court allowed for a settlement in a murder case 
according to Somali customary law. This is very different from the position in the Judicature 
Act. 
The National Land Commission Act66 as well as the Industrial Court Act67 both mandate the 
National Land Commission and the Industrial Court to encourage the application of traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms68 when determining the relevant disputes brought before them. 
__J This provision is largely driven by Article 159 of the Constitution which seeks to promote 
TDRMs as an alternative to the court system. This provision appears again in the Environment 
and Land Court Act69 where the cou11 is allowed to be guided by principles of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms such as TDRMs. In this way, we see the place of customary methods of 
dispute resolution being elevated into statutory law. 
This shows an attempt by the new constitution to elevate the position of customary law given 
that there are several people in the country who have suffered great injustices due to the 
subjugation of the customary law regime. 
4.4 FAMILY LAW AND THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 
The Marriage Act 2014 allows for customary marriages 70 and provides that these marriages are 
to be governed by the customary law of one or both of the intended pm1ies. 71 It further provides 
that parties in customary marriages may opt for traditional dispute resolution or mediation in the 
settlement of their disputes (provided that these are in conformity with the Constitution). This is 
evidence of a deliberate attempt by Parliament to codify the validity of customary marriages. 
64 Kariuki F, 'Custommy Law Jurisprudence from Kenyan courts: Implications for Traditional Justice Systems ' II . 
65 [2013] eKLR. 
66 Cap. 5D. 
67 No. 20 of20 II . 
68 Section 5 (I) (f) National Land Commission Act (20 12); Section 15 (I) Industrial Court Act (20 II) . 
69 Section 20, Environment and Land Court Act (20 I I) . 
70 Part V, Marriage Act (2014). 





Under the Repealed Marriage Act, Cap 150, the provisions of the Act were not applicable to 
marriages celebrated in accordance to customary law.72 This meant that there was no regime 
governing the application of customary law under the Act. With the 2014 Marriage Act we see 
an opporiunity for couples to marry under customary law and have their marriage protected 
under statutory law. They are required, however, to prove the existence of the customary 
marriage if the matter came before the comis. In Rachael Wanjiru Karanja v Nancy Wambui 
Kamau73 The court held that customary marriages must be proved in court by any party that 
alleges its existence. 
As things stand, the Law of Succession Act 1981 is still the definitive law governing succession 
matters and therefore the place of customary in the context of succession law remains as was the 
case prior to the passing of the Constitution. Therefore, as explained in Chapter 3 above, 
customary law is only applicable in succession cases where the Law of Succession Act or any 
other written law permits it. 
4 .5 COUNTY LEGISLATION 
Peter Onyango argues that County legislations may also provide an avenue through which 
customary law may inform legislation. Generally speaking, members of the counties in Kenya 
tend to be either from the same community or from communities that have their ancestral homes 
in adjacent counties. The Constitution empowers counties to make legislation under Article 185, 
as read with the Fomih Schedule (which provides what matters fall within the jurisdiction of the 
county government) . In this way, communities may begin to incorporate principles which are 
similar to those making up their customary law. Notably, the county legislation is limited only to 
those matters allocated to the county government lest a situation arises where a dominant 
community imposes its way of life upon the minority in a pariicular county. Nonetheless, there is 
a possibility for customary law principles to be introduced into county legislation. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Scholars point out that unlike the repealed constitution which made an explicit statement 
regarding the position of customary law, the cmTent Constitution only directly mentions 
customary law within the context of stating its inferiority to the Constitution. It may also be 
72 Section 37, Marriage Act (Repealed) Cap. 150. 
73 [20 15) eKLR 
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argued that Atiicle 159 (3) (c) in providing that TDRMs shall not be used in any way that is 
repugnant to justice and morality, shows the intention of the Constitution to maintain the status 
quo of looking into the repugnancy of a TDRM method without setting out what criteria are to be 
applied in determining the standard. 
What is worth noting as well is that the Judicature Act which is the ultimate authority on the 
hierarchy of laws in Kenya, still remains in force and so its provisions are applicable in cases 
where customary law is brought up. The lack of a definitive statement in the Constitution either 
correcting or continuing the application of the Judicature Act and its position regarding the place 
of customary law as a source of law; doesn' t serve to promote customary law as the provisions 
discussed in the previous section would seem to suggest. 
The question that then comes up is whether customary law as a body of law is re-emerging, or 
whether it is customary principles that are beginning to find their place in the sources of law 
higher up in the hierarchy of laws. The primary hypothesis of this paper is that although we have 
not seen a heightened position of customary law itself, principles largely associated with African 
customary law as opposed to English law (whose principles largely guided legislation) are 
appearing more clearly in cuiTent legislation. 
Take for example the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Expressions Bill 
2015. Although it is yet to be passed into law, it provides for a means through which intellectual 
propetiy may be owned by a community. The Community Land Bill also, when passed, would 
provide a mechanism by which communal rights to land may be registered, how land disputes 
are to be settled, how the community may acquire land etc. These two Bills allow communities 
to own property, a concept which the colonialists completely disregarded despite being a 
principle that was common to traditional African communities. 
These few statutory examples show what seems to be the trend towards codifying principles that 
are original to Africans and are relevant within the African context of those under whom the law 
applies. What is worthy of note, however, is that traditionally, courts have tended to be guided by 
the hierarchy of laws under the Judicature Act and so there is a possibility that most of these 
statues advocating for an elevation of customary principles will conflict with the Judicature Act. 
Given that those provisions such as Section 15 of the Industrial Court Act and Section 20 of the 
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Environment and Land Court Act merely provide that a court may be guided by principles of 
TDRMs, the attitude of the comis may be to continue to subjugate customary law by not 
applying these principles. 74 





5. BENEFITS OF A RE-EMERGENCEOF CUSTOMARY LAW: THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although South Africa isn't the only country in Africa that boasts of a regime that recognizes 
customary law, it has one of the most sophisticated African customary law regimes in Africa. 
The concept of Ubuntu has found its way into the formal South African court system and this 
only serves to complement the great work done by the traditional court system which runs 
parallel to the formal courts in South Africa. In this chapter, the discussion will look at the 
customary law regime in South Africa, first looking at the concept of Ubuntu and how it plays a 
role in judicial making even in the highest levels of the South African judiciary. The chapter will 
I then proceed to look into the traditional court system currently present in South Africa, 
highlighting the pros and cons of the system as whole and then the chapter will conclude by 
making a comparison between the present system in South Africa and the current regime in 
Kenya pointing out what lessons Kenya could learn from the current regime in South Africa. 
5.2 THE CONCEPT OF UBUNTU 
The principle of Ubuntu is widely known as the means through which African customary law has 
found its place in the modern legal framework in South Africa. It is defined loosely as a concept 
of humanism, fairness, solidarity and generosity75 quite similar to ' utu' its Swahili counterpart. 
Desmond Tutu defined the concept of Ubuntu as one where a person is open to others knowing 
that he/she belongs to a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or 
depressed. 76 
The system of Ubuntu has much been likened to the English doctrine of Equity77 given its basic 
premise of treating everyone fairly and in a humane way. At the end of Apartheid, there was an 
oppo1tunity for the elevation of the status of African law in South Africa after the continued 
oppression of the native Africans during colonialism and (thereafter) during the Apartheid era. 
With the Apartheid legacy at the back of their minds, the concept of Ubuntu emerged in the legal 
75 Ochieng P, 'African Customary Law: An introduction ', 113. 
76 http://www.peuplesawa.com/fr/bnnews.php?nid= 1987 accessed on 23'd February 2016 
77 Bennet T, ' Ubuntu: An African Equity' accessed on 
http: //dspace.nwu.ac. zalbitstream/ l 0394/4677 I I /20 I I x 14x4UbuntuBennett.pdf at page 21 , accessed on 23'd 





sphere to ensure a level of fairness that may not be attained as easily in a legal system that 
largely favoured a written form of law but did not match the reality of many Africans who lived 
according to the customary law of their communities. 
As a result of this, the courts in South Africa have applied the concept of Ubuntu in determining 
cases in all spheres. In public law matters for instance, the Constitutional Court in South Africa 
first expressly referTed to Ubuntu in S v Makwanyane 78 where Justices Mokgoro and Langa 
spoke of the concepts of communality and the notion that all human beings should be accorded 
the dignity inherent with their human nature. 
In AZAPO and others v TRC and others,79 the Constitutional court had to grapple with the issue 
of whether the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had acted unconstitutionally in allowing 
amnesty for Apartheid perpetrators. The court held that given the circumstances, the principles of 
fairness (alluding to the concept of Ubuntu) required that there be amnesty for those who come 
forward , otherwise there nobody would ever come forward and so many crimes would have gone 
unpunished. 
We see also the concept of restorative justice (a concept bonowed from the Ubuntu concept) 
applied in South African criminal law when it comes to matters of sentencing. In Af v S 0 the 
court held that in that particular case social rehabilitation was more useful to the accused rather 
than incarceration and the potential loss of the his job. The court assessed the facts of the case 
and looked to the principles of fairness to determine what would be the most relevant form of 
delivering justice in that case. 
The courts in South Africa haven't limited the Ubuntu concept to public law but have also found 
a place for the doctrine in private law. The application of Ubuntu in the private sphere has, 
however, been far less welcome than in public law. 81 In Private law it has largely been felt in 
cases under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, as 
well as the Child Justice Act. Ironically, it has seldom been applied in the law of tort in South 
78 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
79 1996 4 SA 671 (CC). 
80 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC). 
81 BennetT, 'Ubuntu: An African Equity' 40. 
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Africa despite it being similar to principles of Equity and tort law requiring standards such as 
reasonableness, duties of care, etc. 
5.3 THE TRADITIONAL COURT SYSTEM 
Aside from the Ubuntu concept, the presence of customary law in South Africa is felt through 
the traditional court system. This court system has been in place form as early as 1927, with the 
passing of the Black Administration Act82 which allowed traditional authorities to conduct 
judicial activities which were recognized by the state whose decisions may be appealed to the 
magistrates' courts. The power of these courts was respected and its decisions were given effect 
even by the higher courts. Doubts about the authority of the traditional courts were set aside in 
Mdumane v Mtshakule 83 where it was held that the judgments of the traditional courts were 
binding on the parties. 
By 1994, South Africa had as many as 1500 traditional courts84 and their existence 1s 
safeguarded in the South African Constitution 1996.85 These courts function in a distinct manner 
from the rest of the South African court system with unique structures, rules of procedure as well 
as jurisdiction. Notably, the comis have both criminal as well as civil jurisdiction86 where their 
civil jurisdiction is limited to matters governed by customary law (excluding the nullity or 
validity of marriages) while their criminal jurisdiction is over matters under customary or 
common law. Prior to the repeal of the Black Administration Act, the criminal jurisdiction was 
limited by the Third Schedule of the Act. Their criminal jurisdiction was also limited only to 
native Africans and the punishments that they can give were also limited by the Act. The 
traditional courts are presided over by chiefs and deputies. 
The traditional courts are known to be easily accessible to the people, as nearly every village has 
at least one court. They are also known to be cheaper since these cases don't require a lawyer 
and since they are closer to the people, the transportation costs are often negligible. 87 The 
traditional courts are not regarded as courts of record and so most of the proceedings are 
82 Act 38 of 1927 (Repealed). 
83 1948 NAC (C&O) 28 (Bizana). 
84 Koyana 0 , 'Traditional Courts in South Africa in the Twenty First Century' in Fenrich, Galizzi and Higgins, 'The 
Future of Aji-ican CustomGJy Law ' Cambridge University Press, 20 I I, 229. 
85 Item 16 (I) of Schedule 6 , Constitution of the Republic of South Aji-ica (1996) . 
86 Section 12 (I) and section 20, Black Administration Act (Act 38 of 1927). 
87 Koyana 0 , 'Traditional Courts in South Africa in the Twenty First Century ', 231. 
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conducted orally with only the pmiiculars of the parties, the particulars of the claim and the 
defence, and the judgment being recorded. Often, the language used in the proceedings is the 
language of the region where the case is being conducted and so is easily understood by the 
parties. The procedure in the comis is also often simple since the same procedure is followed 
both in civil and criminal cases and often the distinction is not as pronounced in the traditional 
court system as it is in the formal court system. 88 Another characteristic of these courts is that 
they promote reconciliation rather than retribution which minors the values of the traditional 
African society. 
Ce11ain criticisms have been made regarding the traditional cou11 system in South Africa. One 
such criticism is levied against the baning of legal representation before the traditional courts. 
-~ Some scholars even called for the abolition of these courts due to what may have been termed as 
a deprivation of the right to representation before these courts. This very issue was litigated in 
Mahloane v Letele89 where the High Comi affirmed the decision of the magistrate' s court that 
the wisdom of the Legislature was well founded in baning representation in the traditional courts 
based on the fact that these courts mostly dealt with matters which were relatively simple and 
could adequately be dealt with by the chiefs (who are not judicially trained) . 
The fact that the chiefs presiding over these comis are not judicially trained leads to another 
criticism in that they do not meet the constitutional requirement90 that judicial officers ought to 
be appropriately qualified. Some argue that since they are largely untrained in the law, the chiefs 
and deputies presiding over these comis are not appropriately qualified and so ought not to hold 
office. The other side of the argument would be, however, that these chiefs are usually well 
versed in customary law which is the relevant law for the bulk of, if not all , the cases brought 
before them. In this sense one might argue that they are appropriately qualified to handle the 
cases that would largely be brought before them. 
Traditional courts are equally criticised for the lack of a role for women. For one, women are not 
allowed to be chiefs, and fmiher, female litigants are not allowed to present their own case and 
must appoint a male relative to represent them. This issue was meant to be addressed in the 
88 Bekker J, Rautenbach C and Goo lam E, 'Traditional Authority Courts ' in ' Introduction to Legal Pluralism in 
South Africa' LexisNexis/Butterworths 2006, 144. 
89 H.C. Civ/App./93 / 1974. 




Traditional Courts Bill, but unfortunately since the Bill was not passed (some sources feeling 
that the Bill will never be passed91 ) the discrimination of women in these courts continues. 
The procedure in the traditional courts is also seen as unfair on the part of accused persons when 
criminal matters are brought before them. This is so because it places the burden of proof on the 
pmi of the accused and therefore obliges him to speak in total disregard of the right of an accused 
. .1 92 person to remam s1 ent. 
Other critics say that the system ignores the fundamental principle of the separation of powers 
since the chiefs who are appointed to preside over the matters in the traditional courts are also 
executive officials. The responses put forward to this particular criticism are that historically the 
African communities didn't have a doctrine of separation of powers and so the establishment of 
these courts needed the political leaders of the community to be appointed so as to grant the 
comi the legitimacy it required.93 
Some commentators have gone further to criticise the unlimited monetary jurisdiction of the 
traditional comis. They argue that since the courts deal with matters that are simple, and since 
the officers presiding over them are not educated enough to deal with complex cases, then the 
courts should be limited to handle matters of relatively small pecuniary value. This was to be 
addressed by the Traditional Courts Bill which has not been passed as yet. 
What is perhaps the most damning criticism about the traditional comis is that it is a relic of the 
Apartheid era. Some people see their existence as a continuation of the segregation i.e. natives 
are governed by native law while. The preamble of the Repeal of the Black Administration Act 
and Amendment of Certain Laws Act, 2005 94 notes that this is one of the justifications of 
repealing the Black Administration Act. 
All in all, despite some of the weaknesses of the traditional comi system, it is remarkable how 
the courts provide a way through which African customary law can play a significant role in the 
modem African society. 
91 http://www. iol.co.za/sundayindependent/who-ki lled-the-traditional-courts-bill-165481 I accessed on 24th 
February 2016. 
92 South Africa Law Commission, 'The Harmonization of the Common Law and Indigenous Law: Traditional 
Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders' Discussion Paper 82 (May 1999), 2 . 
93 Koyana D, 'Traditional Courts in South Africa in the Twenty First Century ', 233 . 
94 Act No. 28 of2005 
28 
J 
5.4 LESSONS THAT KENYA CAN LEARN FROM SOUTH AFRJCA 
From this discussion above, it is evident that South Africa has a much more sophisticated system 
of African customary law than Kenya does. First, African customary law has a subtle influence 
on the formal judicial system through the Ubuntu concept. Although there is nothing akin to this 
doctrine of fairness based on the principle of communality, the recognition of customary law as a 
source of law, and the fact that courts may be guided by the principles of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanism pursuant to the Kenyan Constitution provides an opportunity for 
customary law to be applied in the dispute resolution process. 
The difference, however is that the judicial history in South Africa shows a level of respect 
accorded to the Ubuntu concept by courts as high as the Constitutional Comt. The Kenya context 
on the other hand shows the continued legacy of the repugnancy clause in the Judicature Act. 
The effect of this clause has been to subjugate customary law even after independence when 
Africans had the opportunity to impose their values into the new society. 
Another rather significant difference between the two nations is the continued existence of 
traditional courts in South Africa as distinguished from the abolishment of the Native courts in 
Kenya. This has also contributed to a significant difference in the sophistication of the African 
customary law systems given that in South Africa traditional comts are empowered to rule 
according to customary law while in Kenya, customary law is left to the optional application of 
the comts in the formal systems. This inevitably leads to a higher place for customary law in 
South Africa as compared to Kenya. 
It may be argued that the difference between the two states is due to the difference in their 
historical development. While Kenya was dominated by the colonialists who left after 
independence, the Africans in South Africa continued to be dominated by the Afrikaner minority 
even after the British colonialists had left. This meant that in the case of the latter, the longer 
subjugation, coupled with the violent history that is associated with the Apartheid system meant 
that for harmony to be restored, the place of African law had to be elevated. In Kenya on the 
contrary, the colonial government left but required the African government to compromise so as 
to protect the settlers who remained behind. This meant that the Kenyans had to maintain several 
of the colonial laws. 
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The difference may also be attributed to a societal perception among the Africans in the two 
nations. In the Kenyan context, there may be a possibility that many of the elites, upon being 
educated looked down upon the African aspects of their culture compared to their native South 
African counterparts who may have associated everything Western with Apartheid. This meant 
that the transition to majority rule meant a more aggressive push for the Africans to maintain the 
system that allowed them to live according to their customary law, and to allow an element that 
is indigenous to them to be applicable in the law. 
All in all, there are several lessons we may learn from the system of African customary law in 
South Africa. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 FINDINGS 
6.1.1 HISTORY OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW AND AFRICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
The study sought to achieve a number of objectives. The first objective was to outline the history 
of customary law and customary legal philosophy. It found that during the pre-colonial period, 
most African societies were ruled by councils of elders at the highest level, while the family was 
the basic political cell of the society. These councils of elders solved disputes in their 
communities and used the customs of the people passed down from generation to generation. 
These customs were informed by a community ' s philosophy of society. There was never a 
distinct philosophy of law among African societies but their cultural philosophy also informed 
their legal philosophy. 
The contact between Africans and Europeans, first through the miSSionanes, then through 
colonization, led to the subjugation of customary law. The conversion of the people to 
Christianity made them view their cultural ways as backward and repugnant, while the 
subsequent colonization by the British led to the imposition of British laws and the formal 
subjugation of African law. 
The attainment of Independence in Kenya led to very little change in the place of customary law. 
The passing of the Judicature Act created a repugnancy test which would be applied when courts 
were to determine whether customary law would be applicable or not. It also limited customary 
law to civil matters. The Magistrates ' Act (repealed) effectively led to the end of the traditional 
court system and placed the power of determining customary law matters in the hands of 
magistrates. The net effect of this was to further subjugate customary law and customary law 
institutions. 
6.1 .2 THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
The study has found that the Constitution of Kenya 2010 has led to a re-emergence in customary 
law. This re-emergence, however, is subtle given that it has no specific provision calling for the 
renaissance of customary law. In fact, article 2 (4) is widely regarded by constitutional scholars 
as only recognizing customary law in a negative sense; as being void if inconsistent with the 




that is distinct to the Kenyan situation, by recognizing certain principles that originate from the 
culture of the people themselves and are not borrowed from the British, whose influence in our 
law is still strong. 
By recognizing the right to culture and the protection of traditional knowledge and the cultural 
heritage of the people of Kenya, communal ownership of land, and by advocating for traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms, the constitution has led (indirectly) to the recognition of concepts 
which would have been alien to the British who colonized us. This is what this study refers to as 
the renaissance of African customary jurisprudence. 
6.1.3 THE PROS AND CONS OF A RENAISSANCE IN CUSTOMARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
One of the underlying objectives of the study was to attempt to predict what the advantages or 
disadvantages of having a customary system would be. Evident from the SM Otieno case, as well 
as judging from some of the criticisms about the traditional court system in South Africa, we see 
that one of the first disadvantages of customary law is its patriarchal nature . As Woodman points 
out, customary laws tend to sustain inequalities in the social order. 95 Discrimination against 
women was common m most if not all African communities and so the laws of these 
communities reflected the lowered status of women in society.96 Women did not have the right to 
inherit, nor did they have the right to be heard when a matter was brought before the adjudicatory 
bodies in the communities (in most societies a council of elders) .97 
In other societies, some practices such as female circumcision, were essential to the community 
and were advocated for in the law. These practices have been found to be repugnant and 
dangerous. A total re-emergence of customary law might lead to the return of some of these 
practices. 
A re-emergence of customary law, however, would be advantageous when dealing with some of 
the historical injustices caused by its subjugation. These injustices arise in a pluralistic society 
where some people live according to one normative order (such as customary law), but 
95 Woodman G, ' A Survey of Customary Laws in Africa ', 12. 
96 Ndulo, Muna, "African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights" Cornell Law Faculty Publications, (20 II) 
accessed on http: //scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?aJ1icle= 1186&context=facpub on 24111 February 
2016, 89. 
97 Koyana D, 'Traditional Com1s in South Africa in the Twenty First Century' , 232 . 
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simultaneously in conflict with a higher normative order (statutory law). The renaissance of 
customary law may accommodate those who would otherwise be disadvantaged. 
The renaissance of customary law further increases avenues through which disputes can be 
settled. For instance, the development of TDRMs in Kenya may ease the pressure on courts, 
particularly where the appropriate remedy would be found in customary law principles. This 
would increase ways through which Kenyans can access justice. 
These are just some of the pros and cons of a re-emergence of customary law. 
6.2 CONCLUSION 
The study has been able to highlight the place of customary law in Kenya. It has shown the effect 
of colonialism on African customary law. The perception of African law, the culture of the 
Africans themselves would never be the same again. Customary law was replaced by written law 
and the English Common law. The subjugation of African customary law was dealt a great blow 
by the repugnancy clause which still operates today as long as the Judicature Act is in force . 
Although the statutes continue to reign above customary law, the inclusion of principles which 
are more African in origin seems to point towards a harmonization of statutory law with 
customary law. In this way, some principles which are more associated with African customary 
law gain the binding force of being a statutory provision unlike only being part of body of 
customary law which is at the lower end of the hierarchy of laws. 
Customary law is also a very malleable thing in itself. It consistently changes with the time. So 
much so that it may be difficult to say that the customary law practiced among the communities 
today is the same customary law that Justice Cotran attempted to codify in his Restatement; and 
neither can it be definitively state that that codification reflects customary law as was prior to 
independence. This may show an element of uncertainty in determining what the law actually is. 
The issue regarding the place of customary law is one which is dependent on more than just the 
law. The difference between Kenya and South Africa is historical as well as societal. Historical 
in the sense that while Kenya's subjugation of customary law may have seemed as a compromise 
in favour of the colonialists, South Africa's elevation of the status of customary was a necessary 






The issue is societal because the value system within the two societies regarding the place of 
African culture differs. In Kenya, for instance, the national and official languages are English 
and Swahili98 while in South Africa there are eleven official languages. 99 This could be seen as 
an attempt to promote more ethnic languages in South Africa based on a policy decision. This in 
turn shows the importance placed on the preservation of African culture in South Africa. It 
would be safe to say that if it were a priority for Kenyans then there might be more effort placed 
in reinstating customary law as a dominant normative order. 
What this study shows is that under the cunent constitutional dispensation in Kenya, some 
attempt has been made to bring back some of the principles of customary law though not 
necessarily changing the status it has in the hierarchy of laws. This is evident since it has no 
express provision contradicting or over-ruling the Judicature Act. What it does do, however, is to 
put in place a system of rights and principles that have continued to affect legislation bearing in 
mind the historical injustice that many Kenyans have faced due to a total disregard oftheir rights 
due to falling outside the statutory normative order. Although at present it seems limited, the 
current state of affairs shows a potential for the renaissance of African customary law, though 
not as customary law, but through various provisions in statute. Only time will tell if this 
renaissance will continue as we continue to implement our constitution. 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.3.1 RECOMMENDATION I : INCREASED INCLUSION OF CUSTOMARY LAW PRINCIPLES IN 
LEGISLATION 
Several injustices occur in a pluralistic society such as ours especially where one normative order 
is subject to another dominant order. Whenever a certain aspect of the subservient normative 
order is inconsistent with the dominant order, then it is invalid. The best way to deal with such 
issues is through harmonisation. If we legislate customary law principles, limiting their 
application to those who ascribe to customary law, then we create an opportunity for them to live 
in accordance with their culture without living outside of the law. 
98 Article 7, Constitution of Kenya (2010) . 





6.3 .2 RECOMMENDATION 2: INCREASED STUDY ON CUSTOMARY LAW 
It is important for greater study to be put into the area, particularly by legal scholars. Though it 
may be difficult to codify customary law, scholars may work hand in hand with anthropologists 
to ascertain what customary principles need to be embodied in the law to ensure that a greater 
deal of Kenyans are not disadvantaged by the current status of customary law. 
6.3 .3 RECOMMENDATION 3: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TDRMS 
Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms create a wonderful opp011unity for customary law to 
impact the lives of those who live according to it. The added advantage is that these mechanisms 
are guide by customary law and so will guarantee it application where it is just as opposed to the 
courts which have traditionally applied the repugnancy clause largely to the detriment of 
customary law. 
6.3.4 RECOMMENDATION 4: JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ADVOCATING FOR 
CUSTOMARY LAW 
The renaissance of customary law and customary legal thinking is largely dependent on 
jurisprudence emanating from the courts. The courts give a clear interpretation of the laws and as 
such play an instrumental role in understanding the legal philosophy behind the law. If the courts 
make more pronouncements in favour of customary law (in so far as the law does not contravene 
any Constitutional rights) then the renaissance of customary law may be realised. 
6.3.5 RECOMMENDATION 5: AMENDMENT OF THE JUDICATURE ACT 
Section 3(2) of the Judicature Act requires courts not to apply customary law in cases where it 
would be repugnant to justice and morality. The problem is that it does not provide a yardstick 
for determining what standards of morality should be applicable. This study proposes that this 
section should be amended to include a subsection clarifying what exactly constitutes 
repugnancy. Borrowing from the Constitution, 100 repugnancy should be based on the 
contravention of the Bill of Rights, and the national values. 101 This basis provides a neutral 
standard for determining the repugnancy of customary law. 
100 Article 159 (3), Constitution of Kenya (20 1 0) 
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